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‘The doctrine of vicarious punishment’: space, religion 
and the Belfast Troubles of 1920 – 22 
Niall Cunningham 
 
ABSTRACT 
Between 1920 and 1922, the city of Belfast, Northern Ireland was the location of intense violence 
between Catholic nationalists and Protestant unionists arising out of the broader political conflict 
engulfing the island.  Approximately 500 people died within the city as a result of these tensions.   There 
existed marked spatial concentration in patterns of fatality during these original ‘Troubles’ which 
accompanied the creation of the Northern Ireland state.  This paper will present findings from research 
into this period which makes use of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) technology to analyse the 
spatial distribution and impact of political and sectarian deaths in the early years of the 1920s.  It finds 
that fatalities were heavily concentrated in districts immediately surrounding the city centre and argues 
that these patterns were profoundly influenced by the nature of the built environment. 
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SHORT TITLE 
‘Vicarious Punishment’ 
 
The Troubles in Northern Ireland from the late 1960s through to the end of the twentieth century have 
been the subject of intense academic debate across a range of disciplines in addition to much wider 
public attention.1  The ‘original’ Troubles, on the other hand, which accompanied the traumatic period 
spanning the partition of Ireland after World War I have received comparatively far less attention; 
indeed , it has been accurately defined as the ‘forgotten conflict’.2  Part of the reason for this may lie in 
the fact that, in contrast to the more recent political conflict in Northern Ireland, the Troubles of the 
early 1920s were, for all their ferocity, relatively short-lived.  Nevertheless, the intensity of the early- 
1920s should not be underestimated.  In 1972, by far the worst year of the recent Troubles, 298 people 
died in Belfast as a direct result of the crisis.3  However, in the first six months of 1922 alone, 285 
fatalities resulted from political and sectarian conflict in the city.  This paper will use Geographical 
Information Systems (GIS) technology to shed new light on the spatial distribution of deaths during the 
early 1920s and specifically to engage with the pervasive idea in nationalist historiography that the 
conflict amounted to a ‘pogrom’ against the city’s minority Catholic population.              
 
HISTORICAL AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXTS 
The Belfast Troubles of 1920-22 were part of a much larger political conflict engulfing the island of 
Ireland after World War I.  During the course of the late-nineteenth century, the religious divide 
between Catholics and Protestants had come to embody a much wider political chasm as the vexed 
issue of Irish Home Rule helped to forge the ideologies of nationalism and unionism.4  On the eve of 
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World War I it finally appeared as if a degree of political autonomy was to be granted to Ireland, the 
idea of which was anathema to the Protestant population which was heavily concentrated in the 
northern province of Ulster and which feared that home rule in a Catholic-dominated state would 
amount to ‘Rome Rule’.5  In 1912, unionist Protestants signed the Ulster Covenant en masse, pledging to 
defend the northern province of Ireland by whatever means were necessary and began illegally 
importing arms into the region.6  In the south, Irish nationalists organised a parallel ‘gun-running’ as the 
seemingly inexorable march towards civil war progressed.7  The naming of the ‘Ulster’ covenant was an 
explicit recognition of the fact that unionists could not hope to fend off home rule indefinitely across the 
entire island, in which they were outnumbered by Catholics in a ratio of about 4:1; only in the northern 
province of Ulster did Protestants represent a majority of the population, and even then it was a modest 
one.8  Yet, despite the irreconcilable political divisions on the island which in turn were inextricably 
linked to a pronounced religious geography going back to the colonisations of the seventeenth century, 
prior to World War I few people would have predicted the partition of the island just a few years later.9  
The outbreak of European hostilities delayed the enactment of home rule for the duration of the war, 
but events in 1916 destroyed any possibility of a rapprochement between nationalists and unionists.  At 
Easter of that year Irish nationalists took part in an abortive rebellion which was quickly suppressed but 
the repressive response of the British turned it into a pyrrhic victory and transformed rebel leaders such 
as James Connolly and Patrick Pearse into republican martyrs.10  Just three months after the Easter 
Rising, Protestant Ulstermen died in their thousands at the Battle of the Somme, contrasting the ‘loyalty’ 
of their sacrifice with the perceived treachery of the Rising.11  Prior to 1916 reconciliation between the 
two sides was improbable; after, it was impossible.     
By the start of 1920, the War of Independence between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the forces 
of the British Crown was intensifying.12  The British Army and civil police force, the Royal Irish 
Constabulary (RIC), found it increasingly difficult to deal with the guerrilla tactics of the IRA, deployed 
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with particular effectiveness in the south-western counties of Cork and Kerry.13  In response to this, the 
British government raised an auxiliary force, composed largely of veterans not long demobilised from 
the World War I to support the hard-pressed RIC, who became better known as ‘Black and Tans’ due to 
the colour of their fatigues.14  They were widely regarded as ill-disciplined with a reputation for 
indiscriminate civilian attacks, the most infamous being a retaliatory arson rampage through the centre 
of Cork in December of 1920 which resulted in extensive destruction of the city centre area.15  
Meanwhile, at a political level, the British had introduced the Government of Ireland Act in the same 
year, which effectively provided for an independent 26 counties in the south, with an option for the six 
northern counties to opt-out of the home rule arrangements within a window of one month.16  These 
provisions were ignored by southern nationalists of the Sinn Féin party, which had swept the board in 
elections and refusing to recognise British jurisdiction formed their own parliament, or Dáil.17  Against 
the backdrop of escalating violence in Ireland, the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George called a 
summit in London and a party of plenipotentiaries was sent from the new Dáil, which included Sinn Féin 
leader Arthur Griffiths and the IRA’s Director of Intelligence Michael Collins.  On 6 December the 
delegates signed a peace treaty on behalf of British and Irish governments which agreed that the island 
would be partitioned (at least in the short-term) between a southern Irish Free State and a new 
Northern Ireland.18  However, more problematic was the failure of the delegates to secure a full 
republic; arriving back in Dublin with dominion status within the United Kingdom and the British 
monarch remaining as titular head of state was seen as an abject failure by republican die-hards like 
Eamon de Valera and Liam Lynch.19  The Dáil subsequently split between those opposing and those 
supporting the new treaty and when it was approved by a narrow margin of 64 votes to 57, de Valera 
and his supporters withdrew and the Irish Civil War subsequently broke out in June 1922.20  Throughout 
this period, Collins had continued to support a covert IRA campaign focussed on the new border, but 
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also sending arms and volunteers to Belfast, partially in defence of the heavily-pressed Catholic 
nationalist population of the city but also in an attempt to destabilise the nascent state.21 
 
While in comparison to the period from 1969, Belfast’s Troubles of 1920-22 have been relatively 
overlooked, the period has featured prominently in histories dealing with Ireland in the revolutionary 
period as well as those focusing on the emergence of the Northern Ireland state.  Most academic energy 
has focussed on debunking nationalist interpretations of the crisis as a one-dimensional sectarian 
pogrom against the Catholic population.  The starting point for this historiographical debate comes from 
one of the earliest attempt to quantify the numbers of dead and injured over the course of the three-
year period.  This was a contemporary account by a young Catholic priest called Fr. Hassan, who 
published Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogroms, 1920-22 immediately following the general decline 
in hostilities in the second half of 1922.22  Hassan’s choice of title, and the fact that the book focused 
solely on the Belfast context, clearly support the notion of a concerted campaign of largely sectarian-
motivated violence against the Catholic minority in Belfast.  And while Catholics certainly did suffer in 
numbers disproportionate to their share of the overall population of the city, to describe the events of 
those years as a ‘pogrom’ neglects the reality that a great many Protestants were also killed and 
displaced from their homes during that traumatic time.23  As the preceding contextual discussion has 
identified, it would seem that events within Belfast cannot be treated in isolation from those across the 
rest of Ulster, and indeed, the rest of the island.  This is a fact which recurs repeatedly in Alan 
Parkinson’s Belfast’s Unholy War of 2004 which remains the only monograph dedicated solely to the 
upheavals of the period 1920 to 1922 in the city.24   
There are two other major academic challenges to the pogrom thesis.  The first lies in the knowledge 
that the role of the IRA in Belfast during the conflict which was clearly not just limited to the protection 
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of vulnerable Catholic enclaves; they also adopted an offensive posture.  The work of the historian A.C. 
Hepburn is considered authoritative on Catholic Belfast in this period and he has written widely on the 
minority’s experience of conflict there.25  In Catholic Belfast and Nationalist Ireland he presents the true 
duality of IRA activity in the city; it was by turns, both defensive and aggressive, and moreover, could not 
be parsed out from much more explicitly offensive republican activities elsewhere in Northern Ireland, 
particularly on the new border.26  The historian Patrick Buckland goes somewhat further arguing that the 
violence of that period can largely be seen as the result of IRA incursions into Northern Ireland and the 
partial rapprochement between pro-and anti-Treaty forces in the Free State as they desperately sought 
to deflect attention from the deepening divisions between them over the Anglo-Irish Treaty 
settlement.27  The most notable example of these republican assaults was the incursion of republican 
forces into the strategically vulnerable and remote Pettitgo-Belleek salient in the south-west corner of 
Northern Ireland.28  This argument is  convincing, although less so is the assertion that many Catholics 
who died in Belfast in this period were the victims of indiscriminate IRA ‘friendly’ fire from within their 
own enclaves; this may be adequate to explain a small minority of fatalities, but is probably not 
satisfactory to stand as a general characterisation.29  There therefore seemed to be an interactive 
relationship between patterns of violence in different places.  The work of the historian Peter Hart 
focused on the activities of the IRA in west Cork, about as far as it possible to travel from Belfast within 
the island of Ireland. 30  However, it is pertinent here as while the spatial propinquity of events in rural 
Cork and urban Belfast is by no means apparent, the temporal linkages are.  Over two consecutive nights 
in late-April of 1922, ten Protestants were killed in and around the small village of Dunmanway.31  
Within the previous fortnight, at least thirty people had lost their lives due to the tensions in Belfast, 
nineteen of whom were Catholic.  For Hart, these events cannot be understood in isolation, and the 
West Cork murders were he suggests, in part, a form of reprisal for the killing of Catholics north of the 
border.32  
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This moves us on to the second argument advanced by historians against the pogrom thesis: the 
influence of demography.  This case was made by Donald Harman Akenson in his 1991 book Small 
Differences, where he states that while the Belfast Troubles of 1920-22 could not be considered a 
‘pogrom’ in the true sense of the word Catholics did come off worse by virtue of the fact that they were 
the ‘weaker of the parties’.33  This is a perhaps a somewhat reductive appraisal of what was actually a 
much more complex situation.  Hart analysed the situation in more detail and has used the city’s 
demography to further erode the pogrom notion, arguing that Catholics, relative to their share of the 
population, were at least as violent as their Protestant neighbours as they accounted for only 23 percent 
of the population but may have been responsible for 44 percent of the deaths.34  It would therefore 
seem that the labelling of entire communities as victims or aggressors is fraught with difficulties in the 
case of Belfast during the partition era and it will become apparent from the analysis that follows that 
categorisations of minority and majority status, victim and aggressor, are entirely scale-dependent.35 
   
DATA AND METHODS 
The research underlying this paper makes extensive use of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) 
technology in conjunction with traditional archival research.  A GIS is commonly thought of as a mapping 
system, but this is an oversimplification of its potential role and capability in historical research; it can 
more usefully be thought of as a database technology, in which a wide range of media can be stored, 
visualised and analysed with reference to their spatial context. 36  The application of quantitative 
methods in history had in the distant past had been scorned, with the Oxford academic Richard Cobb 
mocking the vision of ‘…armies of white-coated assistants employed in the clinical historical 
laboratories’.37  In fact, this was an injustice to the ‘social science’ approach to history advocated by 
Charles Tilly, who was really only calling for a proper mixing of methodologies between the quantitative 
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and the qualitative; the historian’s traditional dependency on archival material had effectively served to 
hamstring the profession by dismissing a potentially important suite of analytical tools, he asserted.38  
Yet quantitative tools like GIS have real limitations; the technology is interrogative and it raises as many 
questions as it seeks to answer.  It is excellent at identifying where historical phenomena occur but 
understanding why is more problematic.  The role of interpreting these patterns cannot be automated, 
and it is here where the role of primary archive research becomes so important.  Archival materials, be 
they military, political, personal, religious or otherwise are rarely aspatial.  They provide specific insights 
about particular places at a given time in their histories.  Historians typically use these to extrapolate a 
broader picture across time and space, or to put it more beautifully, ‘…to re-animate dormant 
memories’.39  It is by meshing these approaches that we can hope to more accurately reflect the 
heterodox nature of the historical experience across space.40            
For the purposes of the following analysis the data on Troubles fatalities in Belfast during the period 
1920-22 was gleaned from a variety of sources.  In the first instance, this was compiled from analysis of 
Belfast daily newspapers, principally the Belfast Telegraph and Irish News, but the Dublin-based Irish 
Times and Freeman’s Journal also provided good coverage, the former having useful summaries of 
events during the previous seven days in its weekly incarnation as the Weekly Irish Times.  The Belfast 
Telegraph and Irish News were both frequently consulted, particularly with reference to some of the 
most traumatic events of the period, such as the Weaver St. playground attack, in order to provide a 
sense of balance in analysing responses to particular occurrences; this is because the Irish News has 
always been aligned with nationalist political opinion and has historically had a predominantly Catholic 
readership, while the Belfast Telegraph has traditionally been seen to represent unionist political 
interests and has always been favoured by the Protestant population.  In addition to these materials, 
early police reports from the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland were also consulted.  Historical 
scholarship naturally tends to favour primary and contemporaneous documentary evidence over 
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secondary and other resources.  However, in the case of attempting to understand sectarian and/or 
political deaths in early-twentieth century Belfast, this is not necessarily the best approach to adopt.  It 
is impossible to arrive at a definitive answer for the exact number of casualties of the political conflict in 
this period based solely on primary evidence, as the information is so often partial, contradictory and 
indeed, missing.  More frequently however, the names of individuals as well as the circumstances and 
locations in which they were killed were incorrectly recorded, and subsequent reports may provide 
updated information, but this could often be quite different to the event as originally published.  This 
process made it difficult to be completely certain that the same people were in fact being referred to.  
This was a particular problem in the most intense periods of conflict, principally during parts of the first 
six months of 1922.  As a contemporaneous account, Hassan’s Belfast Pogroms is prone to some of the 
same sorts of error, in addition to conveying a firmly nationalist conception of the events of that time 
and their causes but it is   nonetheless, still a useful resource.41  However, Alan Parkinson’s Belfast’s 
Unholy War has been the single most invaluable source of information on fatalities during the early 
Troubles, providing circumstantial and spatial details as well as how these deaths related to the conflict 
as whole, not simply within Belfast but also well beyond.42   
The majority of deaths tended to be located at individual street or street intersection level.  Sometimes 
details of a specific building or address were provided.  In a minority of cases Hassan’s Belfast Pogroms 
provided the home address of the individual and other contextual evidence would indicate that the 
victim died in their own home, often when answering the door, as was the case with William Kerr, a 
Catholic of 47 Old Lodge Road.43  Another example of the ability to discern extremely specific locations 
for events was with the death of William Hunter, a Protestant that the Irish Times correspondent 
reported as being killed at the junction of the New Lodge Road and Fountain Street North.44 
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In the case of William Kerr, the ability to link fatalities to particular properties was made possible due to 
the availability of broadly contemporaneous large scale mapping of the city.  Pre-World War II maps of 
Belfast, while extremely detailed at 25” to the mile (1:2,500), do not provide a vital piece of locational 
data that post-war revisions reveal.  The later series of 25” maps, updated in the 1950s and ‘60s also 
included the numbers of individual houses and other buildings at intervals of approximately every 3-4 
properties.  This meant that it was possible to very accurately locate people to given buildings where 
such information existed.   
 
The urban landscape of inner-city Belfast changed very little between the early 1920s and the period of 
the post-WWII map revisions:  in no circumstance did a street mentioned in the early 1920s not appear 
in the later maps.  Belfast was indeed to see radical change in the built environment of the inner-city 
after a long-awaited slum clearance programme finally began to transform much of this area.45  
However, this process did not start to occur until the mid- to late-1960s and really gained momentum in 
the 1970s, after these maps were produced.46    The final major data source employed in this piece of 
analysis are the individual census returns from the 1911 enumeration, the nearest currently available 
record to the Troubles of 1920-22.  The National Archives of Ireland (NAI) has recently completed a 
major programme of digitisation which has made all the original returns freely-available to the public via 
their website.47  Through these remarkable records and the large scale maps it is possible to effectively 
repopulate the city as it ‘existed’, at least as recorded through the lens of the census in 1911.  The 
possibilities and practical challenges in such an ambitious goal are considerable, but this article does at 
least showcase the potential of this material for historical scholarship by piloting a sample repopulation 
of the Old Lodge, the part of the city which witnessed the greatest number of fatalities at the conflict’s 
height during the first six months of 1922.   
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THE SPATIAL, STATISTICAL AND TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICT DEATHS IN BELFAST, 1920 – 
1922  
In total, 491 deaths have been attributed to the conflict in Belfast over the two-year period from 21 July 
1920, when the first fatality was recorded, through to 29 June 1922 with the last entry.  Of these victims 
83 percent were male.  It has been possible, according to the records, to assign religions to the victims in 
just over 95 percent of cases, and of that figure Catholics made up 56 percent while Protestants totalled 
39 percent.  Of the 491 victims, 30 or 6.1 percent were children of up to and including sixteen years of 
age.  Remarkably, this share of fatalities is extremely close to that recorded for children who died in 
Belfast over the much longer period of conflict from 1969 to 2001.  Of the 1541 political deaths recorded 
by Malcolm Sutton as having occurred in the city during the later Troubles, 91 or 5.9 percent were of 
people aged sixteen or under.48  In terms of gender ratio however, there is some divergence in trends 
between the Troubles of 1920-22 and those of 1969-2001.  A smaller proportion of the victims in the 
later Troubles were women with 133 female deaths recorded over the thirty-two-year period from 1969 
to 2001, equating to 8.6 percent of the total figure.  Yet in just under two years between July 1920 and 
June 1922, seventy-eight women died in violent incidents directly accruing from the political situation in 
the city.  So, in summary, when we consider Belfast alone as a zone of conflict, the period between 1920 
and 1922 represents by far the most intense period of political or sectarian killing in its history.  
 
[Figure 1 about here]  
 
Even within this relatively short period of conflict however, the distribution of deaths was heavily 
skewed in both spatial and temporal terms.  Figure 1 shows the breakdown of fatalities per month.  
Over the course of the two years, violence tended to be highest in the summer months and was 
frequently provoked by confrontations surrounding the annual 12 July celebrations in which the Orange 
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lodges, and Protestants in general, celebrate the victory of William III over the Catholic Stuart King, 
James II at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.49  The 12 July celebrations have traditionally been associated 
with increased tension between the two communities in the city and across Northern Ireland more 
generally and this remains the case up to the present.50  However, it was the first six months of 1922 
which witnessed an unprecedented increase in the levels of violence in the city, a cycle which began not 
in the hot, tense days of July but in the altogether chillier month of January, then continuing with 
increasing ferocity through the first half of the year before tailing off rapidly by the summer.         
While the impetus behind conflict in the city between 1920 and 1922 was political, it was in the 
industrial arena that the initial tensions of July 1920 emerged.  Immediately following the return to work 
of Belfast’s Protestant shipyard workers from their annual July 12 holidays, much of the Catholic 
workforce was expelled from the city’s major industrial concerns, such as Harland and Wolff.  This 
followed a mass meeting which denounced the activities of the IRA elsewhere across the island and 
called for the removal of ‘non-loyal’ workers from the yards.51  This came against a background of an 
escalating conflict in the South, where the deployment of the Black and Tans had served only to harden 
support for the IRA.52  The response of the South’s Aireacht or Provisional Government in January of 
1921 was the Belfast Boycott, which as Laffan has stated was, ‘...an understandable reaction to the 
discrimination and attacks suffered by the nationalist minority in the north-east, but the measure failed 
to take account of economic realities and was self-destructive in its effects’.53  The violence of the early 
1920s not only came against the political break-up of the island, it also occurred against a background of 
post-war economic decline; even had the Northern unionist administration been more willing, it would 
have been politically unacceptable to have restored Catholics to their former jobs in a contracting labour 
market.54  The Southern boycott of goods manufactured in Belfast was   not only ill-conceived it was also 
largely ineffectual in anything other than polarising Protestant opinion still further against the South.  
Ernest Blythe, a Presbyterian from Lisburn, was a Sinn Féin T.D. for North Monaghan and Minister for 
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Trade and Commerce in the new Dublin cabinet.  He therefore had a broader perspective on Northern 
Ireland than many of his government colleagues.  In August of 1922 he provided a damning and astute 
analysis of the futility of the policy of economic war the South was attempting to wage against Belfast: 
Economic pressure against the North East gives no greater promise of satisfactory results than 
military action...Nothing that we can do by way of boycott – the economic weapon heretofore in 
use – will bring the Orange party to reason.  A boycott cannot hit the agriculturalists who in the 
Six Counties as in the Twenty Six, represent the most important economic interest.  Their 
market is not in our territory.  No boycott that we can impose can hit the Belfast shipbuilding 
industry.  We control no orders for ships...Our boycott would threaten the Northern ship-
building industry no more than a summer shower would threaten Cave Hill.55 
The Belfast Boycott was proof that while the North and South had become increasingly economically 
disengaged, politically they had not.  Political events across the border were still certain to have 
profound consequences in the new Northern Ireland.  Blythe believed that the perpetuation of policies 
of guerrilla attacks and hubristic economic warfare could ‘only mean within a couple of years the total 
extirpation of the Catholic population of the North East’.56 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Blythe was not alone in drawing such a conclusion.  In February 1922, as the killings approached their 
apogee, Bishop Joseph MacRory, whose diocese included Belfast, wrote in an encyclical to his flock of 
how they were paying the price for the activities of the IRA elsewhere in Northern Ireland in a cycle of 
violence he referred to as ‘the doctrine of vicarious punishment’.57  Some of the key events of this 
deadly period are illustrated in the timeline in Figure 2.  We cannot infer causality solely from the 
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chronological ordering of massacres during this period, but the central point is that within this six month 
period the dynamic of inter-communal bloodshed intensified.  This was in part due to the activities of 
the IRA, but it was also a clear product of the highly sectarian nature of the newly-formed civilian police 
force, the Ulster Reserve Constabulary, which was almost completely Protestant in composition.58  
Members of this body were responsible for some of the worst atrocities of the entire period, which 
included a random retaliatory attack on the Catholics of Arnon Street which claimed the lives of five, 
including that of a man bludgeoned to death in front of his own children, as well as the massacre of the 
Antrim Road publican Owen McMahon and four other members of his family.59  So profoundly divided 
was the newly-formed polity on religious lines that there was no possibility of the gulf being bridged, 
even by the most shocking of incidents.  This is evident in reaction to the killing of six schoolgirls, when a 
bomb was thrown into a playground in the small Catholic enclave of Weaver Street, just off York Road in 
North Belfast.60  Churchill described it in a telegram to Collins as ‘...the worst thing to have happened in 
Ireland in the last three years’.61  Yet despite the particularly heinous nature of the bombing it did not 
even merit mention at the next meeting of the Northern Ireland Cabinet, but the site for ‘Stormont egg-
laying competition’ evidently did.62  Nonetheless, Churchill’s description had incensed the unionist 
leader Sir Edward Carson, who recorded in his diaries, 
Yesterday’s division went very badly for us.  Churchill’s speech the day before was abominably 
clever.  It was absolutely wicked of him to speak of the killing of those Belfast R.C. children by a 
bomb as “the worst thing that has happened in Belfast in 3 years”.  There is no evidence 
whatever, at present, that it was thrown among them on purpose, all we know is that a bomb 
went among them.  But even supposing it was done purposely, it’s a wicked, outrageous crime, 
it is only one, among how many on the other side?63 [Original emphasis]   
While this may have seemed a markedly factional viewpoint, it was one not without some justification.  
Either the IRA or simply armed Catholics had also been responsible for many appalling attacks on 
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Protestant civilians, particularly in areas where the latter formed the minority, such as with the attack 
on the Donnelly family.64  The Donnelly’s were part of the small Protestant population of the 
overwhelmingly-Catholic Smithfield ward.  They had previously been threatened by nationalists but in 
March 1922 a bomb was thrown through the fanlight above their front door, killing a two year-old boy 
instantly and another who died a few days later in hospital.65  Or these attacks took place when 
Protestants were passing through Catholic areas on trams, where, given the highly sectarian nature of 
most of the city’s residential structure, the religion of the passengers could be supposed as Protestant 
based on the route or destination.  Such an indiscriminate bombing claimed the lives of three shipyard 
workers passing through the Catholic Docks area on 22 November 1921.66  Figure 3 shows just how 
concentrated the area of most intense violence was.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Figure 3 uses a GIS technique called kernel density smoothing to map where the intensity of killing was 
greatest.  This is preferable to using individual data points for each victim as it can be unclear from using 
these points whether the symbol refers to one death or several fatalities occurring in the same location.   
Kernel density smoothing works by creating a grid from the underlying point layer, giving a value to each 
cell in the grid which weights more heavily those cells where points are closer together.67  The value 
created measures the number of deaths per square kilometre.  Contour lines were then subsequently 
derived from these grid values which delimit the 50, 75 and 100 deaths per km2 ranges respectively.  
Density smoothing techniques are particularly vital in this context because Figure 3 makes it clear just 
how concentrated fatalities were in an arc running immediately to the north-west of the city centre.  
Despite the fact that the distribution of deaths was so concentrated, analysis against local government 
wards needs to be approached with caution as the epicentre of fatalities crossed a number of 
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boundaries but was focussed on Court, Dock, Smithfield and St. Anne’s.  The last of these is particularly 
problematic due to its peculiar hammerhead shape.  St. Anne’s ward covered the entire central business 
district (CBD) of Belfast, but a long south-westerly ‘handle’ meant that it also extended right out to the 
city stopline.  Pottinger in the east presents similar problems.  The ward saw a very high number of 
deaths during the first period 1920-22, but these were almost without exception located in and around 
the Catholic enclave of the Short Strand at the extreme west of the ward, an anomalous and highly 
vulnerable area within the overwhelmingly Protestant religious landscape of east Belfast.   
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Key to this concentration is that fact that both Catholics and Protestants died in virtually the same 
places, which appeared to act as spatial lightening rods for the wider conflict that was consuming the 
city.  What seemed to set these neighbourhoods apart were two key factors.  The first is that the areas 
in which deaths tended to occur most were those where highly-segregated Catholic and Protestant 
residential districts came up against one another.  The fact of residential propinquity is the critical point 
here and one we will return to.  In relation to the more recent conflict in Northern Ireland such areas 
have become better known as ‘interface’ zones.68  The clear overlap between Catholic and Protestant 
patterns of fatality is highlighted in Figure 4 using the same kernel density technique adopted earlier.  It 
should be noted that the area of greatest intensity for Catholics is larger than that for Protestants, and 
this is logical because, despite being demographically inferior within the city as a whole, making up only 
about one quarter of the population, they accounted for 56 percent of all victims.  This statistic above all 
else plays to nationalist readings of the conflict which have presented it as a simple pogrom against their 
community.  Certainly, Catholics were undeniably a minority in the city and in addition to their 
disproportionate contribution to the death toll many more were also forced from their homes, with 
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about 2000 seeking refuge across the border in the South.69  Michael Collins’ government sought to 
publicise through a sophisticated propaganda machine the sufferings being visited upon Northern 
Catholics by an iniquitous unionist regime.70  While a refugee problem was acknowledged by the British 
government who paid compensation to the Free State administration for the costs incurred in caring for 
these families, this was a temporary state of affairs with most of the displaced returning to Belfast after 
a period of weeks or months.71  This needs to be balanced by the fact that the killing of isolated 
Protestants in remote areas such as West Cork precipitated a parallel refugee situation, with the 
difference being that many of the Southern Protestants never returned to their homes.72  In turn, this 
was seized on by leading unionists at the time, but by 1925 there was no further political capital to be 
gained by either Belfast or Dublin from the miseries of their two displaced minorities.73             
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
The second key factor to consider in interpreting these areas of violence is their proximity to the city 
centre.  The remarkable spatio-temporal intensity of the violence in this period is again powerfully 
reflected in Figure 5.  This uses another GIS tool called mean centre analysis to calculate the Euclidian 
central points for the distributions of deaths in every month of the two-year conflict in which there were 
ten or more fatalities.  During that time the mean centres never ranged more than half a mile in distance 
at their furthest extent.  Furthermore, there is little evidence within the analysis of any progressive 
gravitational pull in terms of events, just a continued oscillation around the same central districts.  In 
part this can be explained by the role of the city centre as a sort of neutral space, in which the territorial 
‘ownership’ of the CBD by one community or the other could not be claimed in the same way as it could 
over most of Belfast’s residential areas.  It was nevertheless a sort of sectarian ‘no-man’s land’ where 
the battle continued to play out.  These metaphors from the Great War are by no means without 
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relevance.  While the conflict of 1920 to 1922 may have been extraordinary even by the troubled 
standards of Belfast, by the Spring of 1922 violence had become almost formulaic, routine or obligatory, 
judging by the observations of one journalist in an article entitled, ‘The lunch hour hate’, clearly echoing 
the grim banality of trench warfare with Belfast’s principal thoroughfare – Royal Avenue, as a sort of 
Passchendaele and the war-weary troops transformed into the city’s everyday workers.74    
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
It is possible through the use of GIS to gain a much deeper insight into the skewed sectarian 
demography of the city just prior to World War I.  The Old Lodge was an area which has now effectively 
disappeared as a result of slum clearance and the building of an urban motorway in the 1960s and 
‘70s.75  This area was the epicentre of conflict deaths in the first six months of 1922, the most deadly 
period of the conflict.  Figure 6 effectively repopulates the area in a GIS using the individual returns from 
the nearest available census in 1911.76  This shows a district that was typical of most of working-class 
Belfast at this time: an area of densely-packed Victorian terraces dominated by one particular religious 
group, in this case, Catholics, who constituted 69 percent of the population.  However, in many 
individual streets the levels of segregation were far higher.  Take for example Alton Street, which is in 
the very centre of the map.  This had an enumerated population of approximately 200 people and was 
100 percent Catholic.  It is only when we understand the extent of micro-scale segregation in the city 
that we can really appreciate why place could be used to predict the religious persuasion of the 
prospective, and frequently, random victim.  So rather than being an inert zone for historical action, 
space took on a sort of agency in dictating patterns of inter-communal violence.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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Ward boundaries are rather aggregate measures but they provide some means of assessing the relative 
risk that minority populations faced from living in particular areas.  Table 1 shows the death rates for the 
two communities across the city’s fifteen wards.  In general the death rate, and therefore the risk factor, 
was far greater for Catholics than it was for Protestants across the city, this fact being a combination of a 
greater fatality rate and a smaller share of the population.  Thus the Court ward was actually a far more 
dangerous place to be a Catholic than the Falls, and this acts as an important corrective to Parkinson’s 
view that the conflict was skewed to the west of the city.77  In fact, this was not the case as the spatial 
evidence has shown that it was heavily concentrated on central and inner-north Belfast and clearly 
remained there for the duration of the conflict.  Mapping provides further potential to explain why this 
may be the case.  Figure 7 shows the infamous Falls-Shankill interface, an area of the city now scarred by 
a substantial fortified peaceline built in the mid-1970s.  Highlighted on Figure 7 are the areas of the 
interface between the Catholic Falls and the Protestant Shankill that were occupied by industrial 
premises in the period 1920-22 and it is clear from the map that these mills and factories may have 
acted to separate the two communities and thus afford each some relative protection.  These buildings 
acted as a buffer because in religious terms, they constituted an indefensible space, unlike most of the 
city’s residential areas.78  It is also evident that where deaths did occur between the Falls and Shankill, 
these tended to be towards the contested and dense residential streets around Cupar Street and 
Kashmir Road where there was no real physical barrier between the two communities.  In the Old Lodge, 
Short Strand and other areas where the highest levels of killing occurred, the sort of inter-communal 
firebreaks which large factories offered simply did not exist and working-class Catholic streets ran 
immediately in to working-class Protestant streets.  So the industrial landscape of West Belfast did not 
prevent violence from occurring, but it did channel it.  Consider the following, 
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The old red and yellow coloured tramcar swayed, whined and groaned over the rails down the Falls 
Road.  There were certain danger points when it passed Cupar Street, Conway Street, 
Northumberland Street and Dover Street; long streets leading from the Falls to the Shankill.  Across 
these streets at moments of tension the report of rifle fire rang out as snipers on both sides opened 
up.  The tram speeded and clanked past those streets as the driver crouched down on the deck 
behind the controls.  The passengers took their cue and huddled down on the floor which the 
Tramways department had thoughtfully provided with a carpet of straw.  There were audible signs 
of relief when the neutral Castle Junction hove in sight.79 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
Finally, it is important to note that while Catholics in general did face an enhanced level of risk of death 
during the conflict across wider areas of the city, the group exposed to the highest death rates were 
actually Protestants living in the overwhelmingly Catholic Smithfield ward, where a ratio of one violent 
Protestant death per every eighty-three Protestant residents was recorded.  This remarkable figure is 
important for two key reasons.  Firstly, it further undermines the notion of a 1920-22 conflict as a 
straightforward pogrom against one section of the population; if the term is to be used at all it may be 
more appropriate to speak of it in the plural rather than the singular because what appears to unite 
both Catholics and Protestants in this period is the fact that both shared a sense of demographic and 
spatial vulnerability.   
 
LEGACIES 
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[Figure 8 about here] 
 
How did the trauma of 1920 to 1922 alter the demographic trajectories of the city in the longer term?    
Between 1911 and 1926 the population of the city was continuing to grow, albeit at a much reduced 
rate from the heyday of the late-nineteenth century.  However, after 1926 Catholic growth rates began 
to outstrip those of the city as a whole for the first time in its history, a trend which would intensify 
throughout the course of the twentieth century and therefore increase the Catholic share of the 
population.80  This is significant for our understanding of the wider causes of the 1920s Troubles, which 
Lynch has argued stray beyond the explicitly political and into the demographic as the perception of a 
rising Catholic population was one of the contributory factors leading to the outbreak of violence. 81  This 
is borne out in contributions to the letters pages of Protestant newspapers immediately prior to the 
outbreak of violence in July 1920.  It is clear from the content and tone of these contributions that they 
were directly inspired by a particularly virulent speech delivered by Carson just a few days earlier at the 
annual ‘Twelfth’ Orange celebrations.82   The key element linking the narratives in these letters is the 
sense of urgency and immediacy, with ‘Observer’ warning on the 15 July that, ‘One should look facts in 
the face…it seems to me that in a comparatively short number of years the majority of Ulster 
inhabitants will undoubtedly be Roman Catholics if things go on as at present…It is time that Unionists 
roused themselves to act, because before very long it will not be possible to do anything’.83  This 
prompted ‘Thor’ to reflect on how and why Protestants had allowed such a situation to come about,  
We Protestants should ask ourselves how it is that Roman Catholics have made such headway in 
our midst?  I think if we did we should not have any difficulty in finding the answer.  We are up 
against an insidious system of “peaceful  penetration” which has to my mind for too long taken 
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advantage of our fear of being called bigoted…it is time Unionist roused themselves to action 
and…unless we do so without delay we shall be left helpless and hopeless very shortly.84 
The great irony of these observations was that while the Catholic population of the city had indeed been 
growing rapidly, it had not been keeping pace with that of the city as a whole.  Consequently, as Figure 8 
shows, the Catholic share of the population was in a gradual long-term decline.  It was only subsequent 
to the trauma of the 1920s that their relative demographic fortunes reversed and Catholics gradually 
grew their share of the city’s population.  So, while Catholics were actually not increasing relative to the 
city as a whole there was a perception among Protestants that this was in fact the case.   
The baseless fear of Catholic encroachment was intensified by the reality that Catholics were over-
represented among the lowest socio-economic echelons of the city’s social structure putting them in 
direct competition with poor Protestants for work and housing, and thus limiting the possibilities for a 
subordination of sectarian imperatives to a unifying class consciousness.85  It was also a possibility that 
unionist leaders were keen to negate, Carson arguing that the cause of labour was simply another of the 
‘insidious methods’ of Catholics and Sinn Féiners in seeking to create ‘disunity amongst our own 
[Protestant] people’.86 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The evidence presented in this paper has served to further undermine the notion that the Belfast 
Troubles of 1920-22 was a simple pogrom.  But perhaps the clearest means of debunking this idea 
comes not from the reinterpretation of documentary evidence or the uncovering of new material, but 
rather through assessing the quantitative effect of this violence, for if it was a pogrom, then it was a 
failed one at most.  Deaths are only one metric, albeit perhaps the ultimate measure of hostility which 
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faces a community; there are many other forms of violence such as expulsion from homes and 
workplaces which had a profound effect on polarising the people of Belfast in this period.  Nevertheless, 
given the highly segregated nature of the city, the spatial analysis of deaths during the conflict does 
provide us with a powerful means of linking place, people and political or sectarian dynamics.  What the 
results of correlation analysis in Table 2 show is a highly significant relationship between the deaths of 
Catholics and the Catholic proportion of the background population.  Catholics died, unsurprisingly, in 
overwhelmingly Catholic areas.  However, this statistical relationship strengthened between 1911 and 
1926, meaning that such areas became more, not less Catholic over time.  In effect, the Catholic 
population of the city responded to the trauma of that period by hunkering down rather than 
dispersing.   
 
[Figure 9 about here] 
 
The other lasting legacy of the period 1920 to 1922 has been in how it exacerbated segregation within 
the city.  In this respect the 1920s Troubles were not unique; however, in terms of the scale of the 
sorting process that the deaths, violence, intimidation and sacking of that period initiated, then those 
three years were without parallel.87  If segregation in Belfast is indeed a ‘ratchet’ as Boal has asserted, 
then the period between 1911 and 1926 probably constituted the greatest tightening of that ratchet in 
the city’s history.88  This sense of a city sorting its population and polarising further is underlined in 
Figure 9, which shows that between 1911 and 1926 in only three of the city’s fifteen wards did both the 
Catholic and Protestant populations grow together, despite the fact that the city as a whole still had a 
growth rate of five percent in this troubled period.  Between 1901 and 1911 Catholic and Protestant 
populations grew in eleven wards and between 1926 and 1937 it was twelve.89  The city was continuing 
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to grow, but it was growing apart.  So while the years between 1920 and 1922 were an important 
milestone, they constituted only one milestone on what has appeared to be a progressive, divergent 
journey for much of Belfast’s history.90   
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has used GIS approaches to uncover the spatial characteristics of political and sectarian 
conflict in Belfast in the early 1920s.  Mapping of fatality patterns has shown that these were extremely 
concentrated in specific neighbourhoods to the north and west of the city centre in the Old Lodge, 
Docks and Smithfield, and on the eastern bank of the River Lagan around the Short Strand.  Catholics 
and Protestants died in the same neighbourhoods, which for demographic, physical and infrastructural 
reasons acted as the battlegrounds for the wider constitutional conflict.  In demographic and physical 
terms they were highly-segregated areas which were not protected from the highly-segregated areas of 
the ‘other’ community through the sort of indefensible residential spaces offered by mills and factories, 
while at an infrastructural level they also marked gateways into the city centre through which people 
from outer suburbs had to transit.  It is therefore argued that the nature of the built environment had 
profound implications for the distribution of patterns of violence.  Furthermore, by repopulating one of 
the most violent areas during the conflict with individual-level data from the 1911 census returns, it has 
been shown how the highly-segregated nature of the city’s working class areas facilitated the random 
targeting of victims based solely on residential location as a proxy for ethno-national or religious 
identity.  These findings have only been made possible through the sort of techniques available through 
GIS and in this respect it can be argued that it has gone beyond the simple where question to address 
why these particular patterns of violence occurred.    
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Why did inter-communal violence erupt with such appalling ferocity in the city in 1920-22?  Horowitz 
has argued that the causes of ethnic and religious conflict are simply too broad to conceptualise, as, ‘A 
bloody phenomenon cannot be explained by a bloodless theory’.91  It is clear that there was a 
pronounced geography to patterns of fatality in the city, but the inherent problems with the pogrom 
thesis undermine the notion that deaths were primarily territorial.  Toft’s theorisation of ‘indivisible 
territory’ may have a perfect resonance in the context of other ethnic disputes, such as those in the 
former Soviet republics of central Asia, but its application to Northern Ireland is more questionable.92  
Deep as the antagonisms in Ulster were and pronounced as its sectarian geography was, Northern 
Ireland was never envisaged as a homogenous state.  It was always acknowledged that there would be a 
Catholic minority population; the partition debates showed it was simply a question of managing that 
minority.93  This is not to say we can completely dismiss attempts to conceptualise ethnic or religious 
violence.  Tilly’s attempt to model patterns of conflict in The Politics of Collective Violence does have 
some currency especially in his identification of the power of ‘settings-based activation’ of antagonism.94  
He argues that the highly-segregated nature of an individual’s social networks continually brought them 
into situations into which their shared religious identity was salient.  These interactions could lead to a 
‘coordinated destruction’ by bringing together people that ‘already have a history of conflict’ in 
surrounds where ‘shows of group strength already belong to the repertoires attached to those 
settings’.95  In Belfast segregation was not confined to the social realm, it also defined much of the 
economic life of the city.  The original outbreak of violence in July 1920 can be attributed to precisely 
this sort of setting-based activation as Catholics were expelled from the shipyards but the fact that 
sectarian modes of congregation were so deeply engrained in the way the city lived, worked, socialised 
and moved meant that the notion of setting-based activism could be seen to run through almost every 
quotidian activity, including the daily commute to the factory, shipyard or mill.  However, the shipyard 
expulsions did not arise out of a political vacuum; they were in turn a reaction by Protestants to the 
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wider crisis engulfing the island and the threat posed by the IRA to the Northern Ireland state itself.96  So 
the disproportionate sufferings of Belfast’s Catholics could be seen as a ‘vicarious punishment’ for the 
activities of their co-religionists elsewhere.   This leads us to the crux of the matter: Belfast in 1920 was 
effectively a fire triangle in which three remarkably potent elements came together to ignite with fury.  
The city’s underlying demographic tensions arguably provided the fuel, as Belfast had been subject to 
periodic outbursts of severe inter-communal violence since the mid nineteenth century, while the 
coming together of an unprecedented political crisis and a severe economic downturn in the aftermath 
of the First World War supplied the oxygen and heat.97  A critic of this conceptualisation of the crisis 
might argue that in a fire triangle model the conflagration depends on all three elements being in place, 
and in Belfast the political crisis and the underlying demography were probably enough alone to 
precipitate what almost amounted at times to an urban civil war.  However, this is to underestimate 
how inseparable economic segregation and stratification were from wider issues of residential 
polarisation and political difference at the everyday level.  It is no accident that the spark that lit the 
flame came from the shipyards and so much of the carnage that followed resulted from people 
commuting to and from highly-segregated workplaces and passing through highly-segregated living 
spaces.  At the level of high politics, this criticism also fails to take account of how macro-economic 
policy was deployed by Dublin as an (albeit desultory) tool of political intervention into the Northern 
Irish polity.  So while Bardon is correct in arguing that what occurred in Belfast during the years 1920-22 
did constitute a ‘vicious sectarian war’ in its execution, its roots really lay in the tumultuous economic 
and political domains rather than in the city’s skewed population base per se.98  As we have seen, 
demography provided a source of ongoing tension and dynamism in the city.  Yet, despite intermittent 
outbreaks of vicious inter-communal violence, viewed in a long-term perspective Belfast in 1922 was 
nevertheless a place of diversity, stability and success.  It was a place to which Catholics and Protestants 
were drawn in huge numbers for the unique economic opportunities it offered on the island and by 
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1911 had overtaken Dublin as the largest city in Ireland.  The overriding lesson from Belfast in the early-
1920s is that there is nothing inevitable about ethnic or religious conflict; events in the city and beyond 
were completely contingent on complex and interrelated dynamics across a number of domains.  
Whatever of its causes, the awful ferocity of the years 1920-22 would once again usher in another 
sustained period of ‘remarkable calm’ that in turn would shape Northern Ireland in the late-twentieth 
century, and almost certainly for the worse.99   
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Figure 1: Deaths per month.  Source: compiled from contemporary reports in the Belfast Telegraph, Freeman’s Journal, Irish News, Irish Times 
and Weekly Irish Times.  Also: Hassan, Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogrom, 1922; Parkinson, Belfast’s Unholy War, 2004.   
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Figure 2: Deaths per week in 1922 and major  
events. Source: compiled from contemporary reports  
in the Belfast Telegraph, Freeman’s Journal, Irish News, 
 Irish Times and Weekly Irish Times.  Also: Hassan, Facts 
 and Figures of the Belfast Pogrom, 1922; Parkinson,  
Belfast’s Unholy War, 2004.
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deaths
 I.R.A intensifies activities on 
the border, killing 4 R.I.C. men 
and abducting a number of 
Protestants  
 Bombing of playground in 
Belfast kills 6 Catholic children 
 R.I.C. kill 6 in attack on the 
Catholic McMahon family 
 Bomb thrown into Protestant 
Donnelly house, killing 2 
children 
 10 Protestants killed by the I.R.A. in 
West Cork over the course of 2 nights 
 R.I.C. attack on the Catholic Old Lodge 
claims 5. In turn a reaction to I.R.A. 
attacks on the R.I.C. 
 Unionist M.P. William Twadell shot, 
provoking violent backlash 
 I.R.A. commence intense arson 
campaign against factories and 
commercial premises 
 Rapid decline in sectarian 
killing as Irish Civil War begins 
in the South, drawing 
republican attention away 
from Northern Ireland 
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Figure 3: Conflict deaths displayed using kernel density smoothing 
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Figure 4: Catholic and Protestant conflict deaths displayed using kernel density smoothing  
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Figure 5: Monthly mean centres of conflict deaths in all months in which casualties totalled ten or more 
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Figure 6: A section of the Old Lodge repopulated according to the 1911 individual census returns 
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Table 1: Death rates for Catholics and Protestants in the fifteen wards of Belfast based on 1911 
population.  Source: Census of Ireland, 1911. 
  death rate 
ward Catholics Protestants 
Clifton 518.68 1330.29 
Court 157.51 1064.39 
Cromac 5345.00 6140.66 
Dock 190.84 398.37 
Duncairn 125.14 6183.00 
Falls 781.34 484.71 
Ormeau 563.83 6097.60 
Pottinger 202.41 1751.50 
Shankill 301.50 5126.33 
Smithfield 513.54 83.07 
St. Anne's 235.82 344.94 
St. George's n/a 3401.60 
Victoria 265.71 1544.93 
Windsor n/a n/a 
Woodvale 110.57 1016.68 
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The Falls-Shankill interface and industrial land use 
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Figure 8: Inter-censal percentage change in the Catholic and total populations of Belfast; Catholic share of the total population of Belfast 
between 1871 and 1961.  Source: Census of Ireland, 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901, 1911 and Census of Northern Ireland, 1926, 1937, 1951 and 1961. 
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
to
ta
l p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 (
%
) 
&
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 c
h
an
ge
 (
%
) 
year
Cath. share
Catholics
Belfast
  
 
 
Catholic 
deaths 
Protestant 
deaths 
Catholics 
1911 (%) 
Catholics 
1926 (%) 
Protestants 
1911 (%) 
Protestants 
1926 (%)  
Catholic deaths 
Spearman's ρ 1.000 .691** .745** .822** -.693** -.641*  
Sig. (2-tailed) . .004 .001 .000 .004 .010  
N 15 15 15 15 15 15  
Protestant 
deaths 
Spearman's ρ .691** 1.000 .433 .479 -.349 -.304  
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 . .107 .071 .203 .270  
N 15 15 15 15 15 15  
Catholics 1911 
(%) 
Spearman's ρ .745** .433 1.000 .971** -.739** -.750**  
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .107 . .000 .002 .001  
N 15 15 15 15 15 15  
Catholics 1926 
(%) 
Spearman's ρ .822** .479 .971** 1.000 -.764** -.764**  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .071 .000 . .001 .001  
N 15 15 15 15 15 15  
Protestants 
1911 (%) 
Spearman's ρ -.693** -.349 -.739** -.764** 1.000 .986**  
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .203 .002 .001 . .000  
N 15 15 15 15 15 15  
Protestants 
1926 (%) 
Spearman's ρ -.641* -.304 -.750** -.764** .986** 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .270 .001 .001 .000 .  
N 15 15 15 15 15 15  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 2: Results of Spearman’s Rank correlation of Catholic and Protestant deaths against ward background populations in 1911 and 1926 
 *Population change rates standardised to ten-year intervals 
Figure 9: Population change between 1901 and 1937 in Belfast’s fifteen wards*.  Source: Census of 
Ireland, 1901 and 1911 and Census of Northern Ireland, 1926 and 1937. 
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